Research

Supported by a generous doctoral scholarship from the Osk. Huttunen Foundation, I am working on a thesis about Friedrich Nietzsche’s criticism of religion. The working title of the project is: “Nietzsche’s Affective Reorientation: The Death of God and the Question of Mood.” I understand my research as a contribution to the lively scholarly discussion about secularisation both within and beyond the academic study of religion. During the last decade, not least through the efforts of Charles Taylor and as a response to his work, research on secularisation has expanded far beyond the confines of classical secularisation theories. A field of research that used to be characterised by a focus on quantifiable features of religious decline in the West is now not only open to global perspectives but also to qualitative approaches from a variety of disciplines. Most importantly for my project, this expansion has led to efforts to describe and understand experiences of losing faith and living a secular life (for example, through in-depth studies on atheism, secularism, and humanism). In this respect, Taylor himself calls above all for a renewed engagement with nineteenth century discussions on secularisation. The importance of these discussions derives far more from their long-term influence than from any dramatic decline of religion during that period. What matters is that quite a few influential intellectuals felt that a monumental change had either happened, was happening, or was going to happen in the near future, and that the change demanded more than merely giving up outdated beliefs. The response would rather have to involve a rethinking of what it means to be human and an articulation of new ideals. The results of this sense of change is summed up by Taylor in his erudite tour-de-force A Secular Age (2007): “The deeper, more anchored forms of unbelief arising in the nineteenth century are basically the same as those which are held today” (p. 369). In other words, the self-interpretations and narratives of thinkers who struggled to move beyond religion touched upon issues that are as relevant to a proper understanding of contemporary unbelief as they are for understanding the past.

Up until our own time two popular ways of narrating the experience of secularisation in the nineteenth century have dominated the discourse—both with roots in the polemics of the period itself. The first emphasises and laments the loss involved in the ‘loss of faith,’ while the other celebrates the emancipation of humans and rejoices in a new sense of freedom. On the one hand, there is diminished life and mourning for a lost ideal; on the other, a newly recovered natural life. What makes Nietzsche specifically interesting in this context is how he complicates the story. Whereas he accepts that both narratives have their roots in experience, his stress on the historical nature and power of emotions radically undermines the idea that getting rid of religious belief leads to a morality in some way more natural than the preceding one. In fact, he challenges the foundation of any belief in a constant human nature. Moreover, he also refuses to accept the account that emphasises loss and mourning, and my doctoral research focuses on his reasons for this refusal. I single out Nietzsche and focus on his understanding of the European religious situation precisely because of his willingness to engage with the following critical question: Is not the value of life diminished when the highest value (God) loses its binding power and is devalued? That Nietzsche asked the right question and provided intriguing answers is a foregone conclusion given his enduring presence in contemporary discussions on philosophical atheism; and there are good reasons to think that, at least his questions about the possibility of fully affirming life, will remain at the centre of the discussion for a good while longer. What this means is that through understanding Nietzsche’s efforts much can be gained for a fuller grasp of secularisation. In other words, I trade off breadth for depth in my research. To put it briefly, I engage Nietzsche’s thinking in order to problematise narratives of secularisation, specifically when it comes to understanding the religious and non-religious possibilities that secular life is haunted by.

Besides contributing to the discussion on secularisation, my doctoral research also fills in a gap in Nietzsche scholarship. Despite the impressive amount of attention that Nietzsche’s psychological thinking has received, those aspect of his psychology that concern what in contemporary academe is called ‘philosophy of emotion’ have hitherto been neglected. This inattention is all the more remarkable, as it can be argued that Nietzsche’s thinking on emotion informs not only the content but also the style of his criticism of religion. Indeed, I advance the thesis that Nietzsche not only writes about the necessity of affective reorientation following the ‘death of God’ but also seeks to guide the reader toward affective states that are conducive to his task. That Nietzsche’s writing has a rich affective dimension has of course not escaped the notice of scholars. One of the commonplaces of Nietzsche scholarship is to emphasise that one has to pay as much attention to the how as to the what of Nietzsche’s writing in order to get a grip of his philosophy. Nevertheless, few studies pay more than lip service to this principle and truly confront the hermeneutical challenge that it poses. In my research I engage critically with scholarship that does take the challenge seriously and with the evidence on the basis of which claims about Nietzsche’s use of affects and mood can be made and have been made by scholars. As my doctoral research testifies, my research interests revolve around the concept of secularisation as well as related categories such as atheism, secularism, and humanism. A particular interest of mine is German intellectual history and philosophy of the nineteenth century. Besides that, I am intensely interested in contemporary questions surrounding migration, integration, and the place of religion in modern societies.